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Can Law Be Art?
by Jack L. Sammons*
During the two days of the Symposium, I felt a little like a baby lamb
at the petting zoo: I was not sure why I was getting all this attention,
but it was certainly very nice.
It is a great honor to have people you admire-and I admire all the
speakers at the Symposium and all the authors collected in this edition
of the Law Review very much-to read your work and listen to what you
might have to say. It is more than that, something beyond description
really, for these same people to engage with that work and take very
seriously things you might have said to them. This is a debt I cannot
repay. All I can do, I think, is to try to pay as much attention to your
work, your thoughts, and your lives as you have to mine. Of course, as
you may suspect, I will need to do this in my own fashion. This paper
then is addressed to all the authors of this Symposium.
You have much in common. There is, however, one commonality I
would like to comment on here. Each one of you, somewhere within your
writing or your teaching, and of course to varying degrees, speaks of law,
or some aspect of law, including its practice, as art. Within your very
large body of work, we find: law as literature, law as theater, law as
poetry, law as music, and law as performance art. We also find the art
of rhetoric, the art of persuasion, the art of narrative, the art of legal
writing, the art of the judicial opinion and the art of reading those
opinions, the art of counseling and of being present to clients, the art of
speaking for others, and the art that all the virtues require, the great
art of practical wisdom.

* Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law Emeritus, Mercer University School of Law. This

Article is dedicated to my wife, Laney, for whom much of the world is art. My great thanks
to David Ritchie for this Symposium. Thanks as well to H. Jefferson Powell, Richard
Dawson, Mark Jones, Richard Sherwin, and Lanier Sammons for insightful comments.
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Now this word, "art," is often used casually-a requirement of
performing well almost any difficult task-without much thought as to its
meaning. But not by you, not by this group! For you the claim that law
is art seems justificatory, and powerfully so for we think of art as selfjustifying, a full stop to what might become an endless regression. This
is what interests me most here.
But can this be? What is this "art"that you draw upon to justify some
aspect of your writing, your teaching, your role, and even your lives?
What sort of justification does art offer to law? Can law be art? And can
it be art in our culture, in our times?
I would like to approach these questions by first turning to art's origin
to determine what "art"is for these purposes. I don't mean art's historic
origin, for that is surely lost in antiquity, but art's phenomenological
origin, or in simpler terms, that which makes art the thing it is, the
thing it is always becoming. To think the origin of art in this way, we
need to examine a work of art carefully by bracketing, as best we can,
all the prior generalizations' we have made about art and about works
of art in order to focus upon the experience of the thing itself; to see a
work of art as it presents itself to us, to put this in phenomenological
terms. This is a very demanding, probably impossible, task at the
extreme, and there are many ways of attempting it. What I will offer
here is a heuristic that, while certainly not perfectly suited to this
difficult task, will at least let us try our hand at it. So join me now in
examining the oldest paintings available to us in all of history, and then,
with the help of what we know about these ancient paintings and the
people who painted them, let us try to imagine an initial experience of
these works of art freed from all of our now subsequent judgments.

1. The word "generalizations" is important here. This bracketing is not an attempt to
remove all preconceptions we might have about art or a work of art, that would be futile,
but to remove inappropriate ones, i.e., those that interfere with our experience of the thing
itself by placing it into some more general category rather than treating it in both its
singularity and its fullness of being. All of this I have tried to capture by using the word
"generalizations." Thus, whenever I refer to bracketing in the text, it is this that I have
in mind.
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Here we have a small section of one of many large compositions of
paintings found in the Chauvet Cave in Southeastern France in 1998.

2. I have relied on the following sources for my understanding of Chauvet Cave, the
paintings within the Cave, the artists who painted them, and this particular panel of
horses. All of these sources, several of which are very recent, are secondary, but they are
often secondary sources written by those responsible for the primary ones and so, I think,
worthy of our trust: ROBERT N. BELLAH, RELIGION IN HUMAN EVOLUTION: FROM THE
PALEOLITHIC TO THE AXIAL AGE (2011); JEAN-MARIE CHAUVET, ELIETTE BRUNEL
DESCHAMPS & CHRISTIAN HILLAIRE, DAwN OF ART: THE CHAUVET CAVE (Paul G. Balm
trans., 1996); JEAN CLOTTES, CAVE ART (2008); JEAN CLOTrES, CHAUVET CAVE: THE ART

OF EARLIEST TIMES (Paul G. Balm trans., 2003); JEAN CLOTTES & DAVID LEWIS-WILLIAMS,
THE SHAMANS OF PREHISTORY: TRANCE AND MAGIC IN THE PAINTED CAVE (1998); GREGORY
CURTIS, THE CAVE PAINTERS: PROBING THE MYSTERIES OF THE WORLD'S FIRST ARTISTS
(2006); CHRISTINE DESDEMAINES-HUGON, STEPPING-STONES: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE ICE
AGE CAVES OF THE DORDOGNE (2010); DAVID LEWIS-WILLIAMS, THE MIND IN THE CAVE:
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF ART (2002); BECOMING HUMAN: OUR PAST, PRESENT,

AND FUTURE (Scientific American eds., 2013); CHRIS STRINGER, LONE SURVIVORS: How WE
CAME TO BE THE ONLY HUMANS ON EARTH (Kindle ed. 2012); IAN TAIrERSALL, MASTERS
OF THE PLANET: THE SEARCH FOR OUR HUMAN ORIGINS (2012); and DAVID S. WHITLEY,
CAVE PAINTINGS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT: THE ORIGIN OF CREATIVITY AND BELIEF (2009).

For most of what I say in the text, there is general agreement among all these sources.
Rather than cite to all, I cite only to one or two sources I relied upon, often using sources
written by Jean Clottes who headed the initial research team for the French Ministry of
Culture.
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Some background is needed: The paintings in the Chauvet Cave are the
oldest known paintings in the world. Their dating, while initially
controversial, is no longer: they are approximately 32,000 years old,3 or
about 4,000 years older than any other cave paintings with dates
confirmed by radiocarbon testing.4 The area within the Chauvet Cave
where these were found is always completely dark, so to paint this
required light from Sylvester pine torches held aloft.5 Since the people
who did the painting did not inhabit the Cave-no people dids-a special
journey into the depths of the Cave with these flickering torch lights
held high was needed not just to paint these horses, but to see them at
all. The animals painted in the Cave-and its paintings are almost
entirely of animals almost all of which are large herbivores-were not
ones typically hunted for food, or domesticated for human use, or even
commonly seen outside the Cave.' They were almost all animals known
not by their relationship to us, to homo sapiens, as resources, as
standing reserve for our eventual use, but animals with lives independent from our own; creatures more admired than used, and seemingly
selected for this reason.'
I described these horses before as part of a large composition, and that
they were, although it took years for researchers to realize this. 1°
These particular horses are from the Panel of Horses, one panel of many,
all carefully arranged within a great and spacious chamber of the Cave.
There are many different kinds of animals in this chamber-the horses
you see here, along with lions, bison, mammoths, rhinoceroses-all

3. This approximate date is a composite of approximately eighty radiocarbon datings
referenced within my sources. Radiocarbon dating offers a date range with a percentage

of how likely it is that the sample falls within that range. Radiocarbon tends to
underestimate dates, so I have selected a slightly older date still well within the various
ranges. See CURTIS, CAVE PAINTERS, supra note 2, at 13; CLOTTES, CAVE ART, supra note
2, at 12, 32; Jean Clottes, Epilogue: Chauvet Cave Today, in CHAUVET, DESCHAMPS &
HILLAIRE, supra note 2, at 122 [hereinafter Clottes, Epilogue]; WHITLEY, supra note 2, at

53.
4. CURTIS, CAvE PAINTERS, supra note 2, at 209. There are two other recently
discovered candidates for the oldest cave paintings: Coliboaia Cave in Romania and a cave
in Maros, Sulawesi in Indonesia. The dates of these paintings have not yet been confirmed
by radiocarbon dating. Nothing I say in the text turns upon Chauvet Cave being the oldest
cave paintings.
5. CLoTTES, CAVE ART, supra note 2, at 16; Clottes, Epilogue, supra note 3, at 96.
6. Clottes, Epilogue, supra note 3, at 95.

7. Id. at 104-05, 110.
8. CLOTrES, CAVE ART, supra note 2, at 21; WHITLEY, supra note 2, at 31.
9.

CURTIS, CAVE PAINTERS, supra note 2, at 20; DESDEMAINES-HUGON, supra note 2,

at 136, 190.
10. CURTIS, CAvE PAINTERS, supra note 2, at 207.
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painted in greatly varying sizes with no attempt to picture them as
standing upon the ground, or there within a landscape, or with a sky
above"-no attempt at realism here-and all carefully positioned in
relation not only to each other within the panels in ways unlikely to be
seen outside the Cave, 12 but also carefully positioned in relation to all
the other animals within the chamber, also in ways unlikely to have
occurred. 3 Almost all14 are gathered peacefully together in large
harmonious groups, as if, as one archaeologist described it, in "a state of
grace."' 5
The outlines of these horses, and the outlines of most of the animals
within the Cave, are etched into its walls in ways that casts shadows:
flickering movements of light and shade produced by the flickering
flames of the pine torches. 6 This effect is heightened by white scraped
areas just beyond the dark charcoal outlines. 7 There is a depth
dimension to these animals as well; a depth to their bodies and to their
features produced by the contours and the textures of the Cave's
walls.'" The crevices and niches within these walls provide perspective
and, in some paintings, suggest a hidden place within from which the
animals seem to have arrived. 9 All of these elements, each one, give
the effect that these animals are living things emerging from the walls
of the Chauvet Cave.2 °
Now imagine with me a young Cro-Magnon tribesman's first journey
into the Cave: frightened, barely able to see, stumbling through the dark

11.

CLoTrSS, CAVE ART, supra note 2, at 20; LEWIs-WLLIAMS, supra note 2, at 194;

CLorrEs & LEWIS-WILLIAMs, THE SHAMANS OF PREHISTORY, supra note 2, at 49.

12.

LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 194-95; DESDEMAINEs-HUGON, supra note 2, at

15.
13. CLOTTES, CAvE ART, supra note 2, at 24.
14. The one possible exception to this is found immediately below the horses. There
are two rhinoceroses facing each other. Some see in this battle; some see it as a prelude
to mating. In either case, it is uniquely narrative, and there is nothing else comparable to
it in the Cave. See CLOTPES & LEWIS-WILLIAMS, THE SHAMANS OF PREHISTORY, supra note
2.
15. WHITLEY, supra note 2, at 75.
16. See CLO'rES, CAVE ART, supranote 2, at 16; LEwis-WILLIAMs, supranote 2, at 221.
17. See CLOrrES, CAVE ART, supra note 2, at 38.
18. CURTIS, CAVE PAINTERS, supra note 2, at 6; WHITLEY, supra note 2, at 73-74.
19. WHITLEY, supra note 2, at 73-74.
20. LEwIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 222 ("The illusion of animals suddenly
materializing out of the darkness is a powerful one."); WHITLEY, supra note 2, at 73-74
("And each horse, when viewed directly in front, seemed literally to be walking out of the

cleft in the wall-emerging through the parted veil that separated the interior of the cave
from the interior of the rocks themselves. It was a stunning and magical visual effect that
no photograph could possibly capture."); see also DESDEMAINES-HUGON, supra note 2, at 2627.
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corridors, not sure of what is to come, not sure of why he is there, led by
the hand of an elder, hearing the voice of the elder reverberating
throughout the cave and reflected back as if it were not his own voice,
and then finally entering this great chamber. Suddenly the walls of the
Cave are moving, shimmering, fluid, alive with living animals emerging
out of the clay of the walls!21 Something new, our young tribesman
would think upon seeing these, has been created in the world! There are
now horses where none existed before, living things in the Cave where
none were before and none could be; living things that are not there, but
yet they are; living things pointing beyond and behind themselves in a
mysterious way while remaining only themselves; and doing this so
powerfully that their dynamic force, once felt, could never be forgotten.

These animals were works of imagination, not representations. There
is no "back and forth" here with something seen outside the Cave. Yet,
they were almost certainly not subjective expressions of an artist in the
way we may think of imaginative works: not something there within the
mind of the artist awaiting its external manifestation to be real. They
were instead something experienced by the artist much as our young
tribesman experienced them, as something emerging (as a composer, for
example, might experience a melody which suddenly appears). For the
artists who painted them, these horses were something already real
before they were painted; something already there, but not seen before;
something, that is, they had only uncovered.22

21. LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 195. I am not just imagining this with you. That
this would have been the experience we have confirmed for us by the ability these
paintings have now to reduce the hardened scientists who spend their lives studying the
Cave-archaeologists, anthropologists, paleontologists, ethnologists, geologists, and so

forth-to poetry as they try to describe their own first experiences of the paintings. They
do so almost without exception exactly as I just described a young tribesman's experience
of the paintings to you. See, e.g., DESDEMAINES-HUGON, supra note 2, at 5. The Cave has
the "quality of a dream," one writer said, and, scientist to the core, he added: "[This had]

prompted me to verify my visit there with my friends." WHIrLEY, supra note 2, at 74.
22. It is very likely the artists of the Cave paintings would have felt this way. It is
very likely that the artists who painted these horses felt as if they were only facilitating
the emergence of these creatures from the walls of the Cave, offering images which drew

themselves, gifts transformed See LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 193 ("They were not
inventing images. They were merely touching what was already there.") (They were
pulling out of stone animals already there."); see also id.; WHITLEY, supra note 2, at 7-8;
DESDEMAINES-HUGON, supra note 2, at 13. There are many reasons for believing this to be

true: the figures were strongly suggested by the contours (such that current archaeologists
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This, however, is not as odd as it may seem to you: it is the muse they
were feeling, we might say now with a pretense of the poetic at the time
of her first appearance when her presence could be strongly felt, a time
when concepts did not get in her lovely way.
Now imagine-this is central to our heuristic-this young tribesman
emerging from the Cave after the experience of these mysterious horses.
Imagine a chance sighting of a horse (or a bison, a lion, a rhinoceros, a
mammoth or any of the other animals living in the Cave). Out of the
semblance of this horse to the horses in the painting, the horse outside
the Cave could now be seen anew, seen as also pointing beyond and
behind itself. Alive, yes of course, but now in a different way, a way
that leads back to the Cave, we might say, or, to use Hegel and
Heidegger's term borrowed from Plato, as "shining.'m And each horse
(or each bison, lion, rhinoceros, and so on, and perhaps any living thing)
from now on would always have the potential of being seen in this
mysterious way.24

sometimes see animals in the cave walls when none are there); they lacked the realism of
their usual surroundings; the art is surprisingly sophisticated yet these were painted
quickly and almost without mistakes; the art became a very long (20,000 years!) (CURTIS,
CAVE PAINTERS, supranote 2, at 29-30) and very stable tradition; and ethnologists find the
same experience of things painting themselves in what remains of the cave art tradition
in our time. See generally DAvID LEWIS-WILLIAMS & SAM CHALLIs, DECIPHERING ANCIENT
MINDS: THE MYSTERY OF SAN BUSHMAN ROCK ART (2011); see also CLOTTES & LEWISWILLIAMS, THE SHAMANS OF PREHISTORY, supra note 2, at 63.

23.

For a discussion of this term in this context, and its origins, see JOHN SALLIS,

TRANSFIGUREMENTS: ON THE TRUE SENSE OF ART 6-7, 16-17, 78-79 (2008). See also
CLoTs & LEWIS-WILLIAMS, THE SHAMANS OF PREHISTORY, supra note 2, at 63.

24. If you will forgive me-and I hope this is not discrediting-for something personal,
I will attest to the fact that these paintings still work the way I described them working
in the text. To say that I have not been an equestrian is to put it very mildly. I have been
afraid of horses all my life, after some dreadful experiences at a youth summer camp. (My
wife and I once had a very reliable mule named "Hanky" in honor of Hank Aaron, but
that's another matter.) After spending almost a year with this painting, however, horses
have become unique, mystical, extraordinarily beautiful creatures for me to whom I am
now suddenly attracted. Their facial expressions, for example, have taken on a meaningful
significance they never had before. There is no doubt for me that they "shine," and I have
at least started the process of asking one to join our family if the fates permit. There is
more to this. During the entire time of working on this article, I was haunted by a terrible
image. (Read no further if you wish to avoid the same!) It is one I heard about, but
thankfully did not see, in some television documentary. It is the image of the coal-mine
horses, the ones which, as soon as they were old enough to "work," were taken down into
the mines to pull coal carts back and forth; never again to feel the warmth of the sun or
to see any light other than the light of the miner's helmets and the torches along the routes
of the carts; never again to feel any touch other than that of the harness and the whip.
After living with the images of horses there within the Chauvet Cave for almost a year,
horses also there within a "mine" if you will, the coal-mine horses came to symbolize for
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In this way, the paintings in the Cave would have constructed a world
for these Cro-Magnon tribesmen, as we say language can construct and
reconstruct our own world. And an ever present alterity-a different
world that is also in this world, a sensible one that seems, nevertheless,
beyond our senses -would have been created. We say now that after one
has seen Van Gogh's Sunflowers, no sunflower ever looks the same.
Imagine the first time this odd and unsettling thing happened, an
experience like none before. Imagine a people who come to identify who
they are with this experience-personally shared for some and then
recounted to many, many others. Imagine these paintings "gathering"
the tribe as a people, as a Greek temple-the one at Paestum perhaps-or
a castle, or a church, or a mound in the Old Fields of the Muscogee
people just across the Ocmulgee River from Mercer Law School, might
gather a community to it. Imagine this experience as their "origin," the
tribe's origin, as a people, the way in which they come to know who they
are. You will then have imagined the full experience of the paintings of
the Chauvet Cave, and, through this examination of that experience, the
origin of a work of art: that which makes art the thing it is and the
thing it is always becoming.
What is this thing then? It is an art central to the lives of a people
because it offers to them a truth, a way of seeing and of being in the
world, a way which then becomes for them a way of life to be tested only
by living it. 5

me as clearly as anything could the problems of our thinking of the world as at our disposal
as standing reserve. It is, therefore, very interesting to me that horses dominate
Paleolithic art. See CLOTTES & LEWIS-WILLIAMS, THE SHAMANS OF PREHISTORY, supranote

2, at 42.
25. It has become common to say that the paintings of the Chauvet Cave were not just
at the dawn of art, for this is obviously true, but that they are near the moment of creation
of that which we call "human," coming, as they did, during the beginning of a period known
as the "Human Revolution," or the "Transition," or the "Creative Explosion." See, e.g.,
STRINGER, LONE SuRVIVOR, supra note 2, at 1964-2321. It is through the creative ability
these Cro-Magnons had, the creative ability to uncover this alterity-something there and
yet not there, something immaterial that can nevertheless be felt in a very material way,
and something which then shaped their perceptions of other things-a creative ability

Aristotle, tens of thousands of years later, would describe as there in our nature and
defining who we are-that we became human, and, in a very real sense, that you, each of
you, became the person you are. For a discussion of this in Aristotle, see DENNIS J.
SCHMIDT, BETWEEN WORD AND IMAGE: HEIDEGGER, KLEE, AND GADAMER ON GESTURE AND
GENESIS 7-8 (2013). Schmidt's book is simply excellent and well worth reading for many
reasons.
It seems reasonably clear that the most important long term differences between the Cro-

Magnons and the Neanderthals, those differences producing a difference in evolutionary
potential, were cultural. Cave art, such as the art of the Chauvet Cave, offered to the CroMagnons an identity not dependent upon more immediate and more physical connections
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With this in place, we can say that that which may seem to us too
quaint, too precious, too mysterious, too otherworldly, too spiritual, when
an Aborigine cave artist or Sans Bushman of today says that his hand
is guided by the spirit within the walls upon which he draws is but a
true reflection of the mode of reality that gave us our identity and made
us human. Call this the spirit as he might, call this the muse with the
Greeks as I did a moment ago, call it the angels with the Hebrews, call
it the gods, call it God, call it nothing or call it "no-thing," as you choose,

of one to the other. This permitted Cro-Magnon tribes to develop into much larger groups
than those of their neighbors, the Neanderthals, whose tribes were dependent on such
contacts and, therefore, limited in size-the limit is referred to as the "Dunbar Number"
following the research of Robin Dunbar and it averages at approximately one hundred and
fifty. See STRINGER, LONE SURVIVOR, supra note 2, at 1943. The larger groups offered
clear evolutionary advantages. This is extremely interesting, I think. Cave art, which was
not intended as something to provide an evolutionary advantage, and of this we can be
sure, provided the most important advantage of all: continuing survival. So something that
seemed to exist only for its own reasons, something not functional, something not
instrumental at all, turned out to be what was most important for our continuing existence.
(Is there an analogy here?).
Of course, in their most assertive forms, these claims about the centrality of the earliest
cave paintings to the origin of our humanity are controversial. For our purposes here,
however, these interesting controversies are not important. What is important is that
during this time in Europe-a time when the Cro-Magnons were beginning to be the
dominant creatures in the world and the Neanderthals, who had no art of the alterity
creating type we have been examining, (see, e.g., LEwiS-WILLIAMs, THE MIND IN THE CAVE,
supra note 2, at 71; CLOrrES, CAVE ART, supra note 2, at 11; STRINGER, LONE SURVIVOR,
supra note 2, at Kindle 2697) were reaching their end-there was an unprecedented
explosion of a unique homo sapiens form of creativity, that this creativity produced "virtual
worlds" (as the anthropologists often call this alterity of thought), that these worlds and
this creativity are best displayed in the cave paintings, and that these paintings were
identity conferring in a way that enhanced our evolutionary potential. (There may well
have been "flickering" of this same form of this same form of creativity long before in
Africa, and Africa may well be its historical origin, but the extent of the "explosion" at this
place and in this time was unprecedented according to all the accounts I have read.).
These conjectures are enough for us, and there is very little controversy about any of them.
Finally, it is not necessary that we choose from among the various explanations
anthropologists, archeologists, historians, ethnologists, and others offer for the "virtual
world" of this unique creative ability: remembered dreams, hallucinatory plants, mutations,
Shamanistic religions (with their spirit worlds), the emergency of symbolic language, or of
music, or of ritualistic behavior, and so forth. It seems to me, however, that all these
explanations should fall to Occam's Razor for all that need be posited are a creative instinct
(perhaps one stronger than the Neanderthal's by a small degree) and the requirements of
art itself.
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it is our origin in large measure and our identity in the same. It is real
for us, and we are in this sense, as were our Cro-Magnon tribesmen, the
people of the Chauvet Cave. For out of this alterity, this source of our
uniqueness as humans, eventually arose (and continuously arises) all the
cultural entities we think of as most important to our lives together:
beauty, love, the person, the self, the sacred (including that divine spark
within each of us, each "shining" in this way), all religions, all myths, all
morals, every polity, all rituals, all arts (for it is only in the alterity that
art uncovered that art can exist), and so music, painting, sculpture,
architecture, dance, poetry, prose, film, and on and on to include, with
you, law and justice.

But what does this mean for us now? Can art be connected to truth
for us? Can art be central to our lives, central to our identity, as it is at
its origin and in its essence, rather than a merely tangential aesthetic
pleasure? After Chauvet-if this is the phenomenology of art-if the real
reason art seems to offer justification is in a connection to truth-the
question arises not so much whether we can think of law as art, but
where there can be any art in our time at all, or, with Hegel, are we
doomed to attempts to replicate its past?2 6 There are several possible
responses to this, but here I would like to turn to one artist, who, I
think, can perhaps best help us in our thinking both of the possibility of

26. This is the question that Hegel raised about art because he did not think that art
could be reconnected to truth, so, for Hegel, the highest form of art would always be
something in the past to which art could refer of course, but never do again. See discussion
of this in SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 67-75, and SALLIS, TRANSFIGUREMENTS, supra note
23. The well known Hegel quote in this regards is "Art no longer counts for us as the
highest manner in which truth obtains existence for itself." Id. at 156.
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art in our time and then of law as art, Wassily Kendinsky,27 and to this
painting, Composition VI.

Composition VI's theme-and it is very interesting, is it not, that it has
a theme-is The Deluge."5 You must try to imagine seeing this painting
in its full size for it is six by ten feet and overwhelming. To be able to
paint this, we know from sketches and his notebooks, took Kandinsky
sixteen months of preparation, and it was very hard work. To arrive at

27. For what I say about Wassily Kandinsky, his writings, his paintings, and for
Composition VI, I have relied upon the following sources:, SCHONBERG AND KANDINSKY: AN
HISTORIC ENCOUNTER (Konrad Boehmer ed., 1997); MAGDALENA DABROwsKi, KANDINSKY
COMPOSITIONS (1995); MICHEL HENRY, SEEING THE INVISIBLE: ON KANDINSKY (Scott
Davidson trans., 2009); ULRIKE BECKS-MALORNY, WASSILY KANDINSKY: THE JOURNEY TO
ABSTRACTION (2007); JOHN SALLIS, SHADES-OF PAINTING AT THE LIMIT (1998); JOHN
SALLIS, TRANSFIGUREMENTS, supra note 23; and the following of Kandinsky's own writings:
WASSILY KANDINKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART

(M.T.H. Sadler trans., Dover ed.

1977); WASSILY KANDINSKY, POINT AND LINE TO PLANE (Howard Dearstyne & Hilla Rebay
trans., Dover ed. 1979); WASSILY KANDINSKY, THE ART OF SPIRITUAL HARMONY (Michael
T.H. Sadler trans., 2007); and Wassily Kandinsky, Concrete Art, in ART AND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AESTHETIC THEORY (Stephen David Ross ed., 3d ed.
1994). Kandinsky's writings are also collected in KANDINSKY: COMPLETE WRITINGS ON ART
(Kenneth C. Lindsay & Peter Virgo eds., 1994).
28. There are several excellent discussions of Composition VI, all of which rely in part
on Kandinsky's own notes published in KANDINSKY 1901-1913 (1913). See, e.g., DABROWSKI,
KANDINSKY COMPOSITIONS, supra note 27, at 37.

538

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the place where the painting would appear for him," he had to make
himself stop thinking about the deluge, that is, about the Biblical
narrative, entirely. At the suggestion of a colleague, he did this by using
his own form of the "bracketing" we did earlier with our heuristic. He
decided to focus only upon the word "deluge" itself, which he would say
to himself over and over again as he thought about the painting.30
Does such bracketing leave the external world behind? Of course not,
the word carries much of the world with it, and such was not his
intention in any case as we have seen. Instead, this bracketing
permitted him to focus upon the thing itself, to free it, we might say, so
that it could speak and be seen.
What he has painted here is a tension between the catastrophic and
the Arcadian, an internal visual counterpoint found mostly in the colors,
but also in the shapes. Overtime as you look at these counterpoints
their tensions shift into an overwhelming sense of waves, of motion, of
certain colors (each with its own dynamic force) sometimes coming to
prevail over others, and, yes, of music. Although he could not know
what the painting would become, what it became, he said, is "a living
paean of praise, the hymn of that new creation."3 ' This is not the
message of the Biblical story or the one of the myth of the great flood
shared by almost all the cultures of the world. It is, instead, that out of
which the story and the myths arose. For what is painted here, this
hymn, has been "brought forth in deed in the very [act ofi painting."32
Can you hear it? Can you feel its shape, its mood, its ambiance, its
rhythm, its tensions, its resolutions-the play of its dynamic forces-in the
way you might with a symphony? Take your time with it! This painting
has a temporal element; it is an event as music is. It changes, evolves,
progresses, as you watch it, and thus it demands your time, as music
does. It also requires a struggle against our mental habit of always
returning to previous thoughts, always seeking confirmation of what we
already know. It requires as well, as we have seen, a disciplined focus
upon the materials of the art itself as it did for Kandinsky. In a very
real sense it requires that you submit yourself for the moment to its
authority, as one might a religious or a legal text. This isn't asking you

29. "Every form I ever used arrived 'of its own accord,' presenting itself fully fledged
before my eyes, so that I had only to copy it, or else constituting itself actually in the
course of work, often to my own surprise." KANDINSKY: COMPLETE WRITINGS

ON ART,

supra

note 27, at 370. Compare this to what we said about the artists who painted the Panel of
Horses to see how ordinary what we imagined about them, i.e., "gifts transformed," is.
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id. at 388.
32.

SALLIS, SHADES-OF PAINTING AT THE LIMIT, supra note 27, at 113.
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to stop thinking, to turn off your mind, but to start thinking, to turn it
on, by being open to possibilities of thoughts and way of thinking you
may not have experienced before. It is a turn, as Kandinsky might put
it, to the inner life of things.
Of course, this is very hard for us to do, but, overtime and with a
humble receptiveness, a "communion of sympathy," an open mind, and
a sufficient struggle to listen, if you can come to hear it-and this will,
I think, always come as a surprise-then, like the young tribesman as he
stepped outside the Cave, this painting, I believe through my own
experience of it, has the potential of reconstructing your world, however
briefly, into one that is much more than perhaps you had come to expect:
a world that may "shine" even at the moment of its own destruction.
This is a world of endless tensions, but with a continuing birth. This is
also a specific case of what all art, thinking of it in Kandinsky's terms,
has to teach us. "The coming into being one finds in the work of art is,
in some sense, to be understood as a sort of birth, and it is precisely this
birth of the new, this movement into and of life, that is obstructed in the
present age."' The painting is not a resolution of these tensions or a
resignation to them so much as it is a celebration of tensions, as music
always is, in ways that are life-affirming. This is a different way of
thinking the "deluge," one far more complex, far more fascinating I
think, and much more insistent about the commitment any thought of
the deluge might require of us. If you hear it, the deluge would now no
longer be a text, no longer a story, no longer a myth, no longer a matter
of theology or belief, no longer a faith, and no longer a hope. For you,
it would be a truth, art's truth, and no less authentic for its brevity,
because you would have experienced it emerging from the painting (as
the horses emerged from the wall of the Chauvet Cave) and offering to
you a fuller, identity conferring, way of life to be tested only by living it.
The evident truth the painting bears and its apparent goodness would
attract you to this way of life. Events in your own life, your own
"deluges" perhaps, could come to be seen in light of the painting, and
that which may have been invisible to you in those events as you sought
to understand them rendered visible to you. And then perhaps, if you
were so inclined, you would also discover that, almost without thought,
you had entered the world of the Biblical text in a way you could
scarcely have imagined before.'

33.
34.

SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 94 (discussing Heidegger on art).
For those of you familiar with some of my other writings, you may have noted that

I have done something in this one that I seldom do: kept theological concerns completely
out of it. The reason for this is that Kandinsky's approach to art requires it, or so it seems
to me. If you approached this painting, for example, as a theological work, I do think you
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How did he do this? Kandinsky is father of abstract art, but he did not
intend to be offering something new. Instead, the problem he was
addressing is the same as the question we uncovered earlier: If the
essence of art is in a connection to truth, can there be art in our time?
If we can examine how Kandinsky answered this, how he showed us
art's continuing in our time through his paintings, perhaps we can find
guidance for how we can now think of law as art, and, in this, see our
own lingering use of art as a justification as something more than just
a past lingering.
Kandinsky is best known as the father of abstract art. How then can
he help us, you must be thinking? The Chauvet Cave horses are not
purely representative art, not realism, but they are not abstract art, are
they? For Kandinsky, however, they are abstract paintings, which is to
say in his terms-terms later and more famously adopted by one of his
disciples, Paul Klee35 and the phenomenologist, Maurice MerleauPonty 5 -that these paintings made the invisible visible, for this is what
Abstraction is the freeing of
abstraction means for Kandinsky."
painting from its adherence to the purely visible in order to return it to
its essence of becoming,38 that "essence"39 that I was seeking with you
through our heuristic of the cave paintings.4 ° This essence, the

would not be able to experience whatever inherent theology it may have. This is true
despite the fact that Kandinsky was a Russian Orthodox Christian who never abandoned
his faith, let it shape his work, and who thought of this work in spiritual terms. See, e.g.,
KANDINSKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART, supra note 27, at v (Preface written by
Richard Stratton). If you are, however, interested in the Christian theology of something
close to a phenomenological approach to art, I would highly recommend AIDIAN NICHOLS,
THE ART OF GOD INCARNATE: THEOLOGY AND IMAGE IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION (Paulist Press

1980).
35. "Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible." PAUL KLEE, CREATIVE
CONFESSIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (2014). See discussion of Klee's use of this
expression in SALLIS, TRANSFIGUREMENTS, supra note 23, at 19-20, and generally in
SCHMIDT, BETWEEN THE WORD AND THE IMAGE, supra note 25.

36. Seegenerally MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE (Alphonso
Lingis trans., 1969).
37. See generally HENRY, supra note 27.

38. Id.
39. Prior to this I have avoided using the word "essence," but must use it here because
authors I rely upon in the text do. I have avoided the word because people tend to think
of an essence as something fixed, unchanging, not contingent, and so forth. The only thing
about "essence," as it is used here that is unchanging is the fact that it is a continuous
becoming. In other words, it is never fixed other than the fact that it is never fixed.
40. "[Albstract painting leads us back to the source of all paintings." HENRY, supra
note 27, at 3 (discussing Kandinsky's understanding of abstract painting).
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"internal" of paintings as he names it,41 is the true content of all
paintings, and as such it is the "internal truth" painting offers to us,42
just as, we can now add by way of analogy, the paintings of the Chauvet
Cave both created and offered a truth about their world to our CroMagnon tribesman.
In both cases, however, the form of truth offered is not and could not
be truth as a correspondence to anything else or a coherence within some
system of thought. In other words, and as Kandinsky's concerns with
representations makes clear, this "truth" is not truth as we now most
commonly use the term. When we ask if something is true, we are
typically asking if some concept matches something we think of as
reality. The form of truth that art is for Kandinsky, however, the form
in which art can be said to offer a truth, is the uncovering of that reality
which must precede any truth as correspondence or coherence.43 This

KANDINSKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART, supra note 27, at 2.
42. Id. at 9.
43. This form of truth is difficult to understand. If I were teaching, for example,
pointed to the podium I was standing behind, and asked the class to tell me what it was,
they would very likely tell me it is a podium by which they would mean that it falls within
the concept "podium" by having all the same or almost all the same physical characteristics
and apparently serving the same functions. This is one form of truth. It is truth as
correspondence in the sense of the concept "podium" corresponding to a reality "podium."
If, in response to my question, someone said it was a chair, we would say that isn't true,
i.e., the concept and reality don't correspond. But notice that truth as correspondence turns
upon a particular perception and a particular experience of a particular reality, in this
case, the presented reality of the podium. This is a truth of presence, for the concept of
podium the students had in mind would likely only include what is presented by its
physical appearance and its current functioning. But what if one student perceived the
podium in very different ways, e.g., thought of those who had made the podium and their
lives as those were involved in the making of the podium; thought of the materials used,
and the natural-is the wood still alive as some insist-or manmade history of those
materials; thought of the podium's unique role in communications with its symbolic
authority its distancing of speaker from listener, its amplification of one voice; thought of
the way this particular podium had arrived at its location, how it was cared for and by
whom, and what its future might be, and so forth? For this student there would be a vast
number of ways of being a podium, a vast number of realities of it we could say, each, as
we focused upon it, uncovering a truth about the podium while also covering some other
truth about it, for of concern here would not just be the world of this particular
podium-and we can see that its world is quite extensive-but that it has a world at all and
is, therefore, always more than it is in the sense that there is always more to be uncovered
about it. There in the podium are realities, in other words, that are always there, but
cannot be experienced until they are uncovered. So "truth" can never be just a matter of
matching concepts to a reality because what that reality is, the one to which the concept
must correspond, must first be uncovered-it was uncovered as presence in our classroom
example-and it can be uncovered in many, many, ways. Thus, any truth about the podium
can be at most a partial truth, and truth itself becomes a matter of degree. It is this sort
of "uncovering" of reality that is the concern of aletheiac truth. (Notice that this is a
41.
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truth, truth as an uncovering, or truth as aletheia in Ancient Greek, is
the sort of truth that the truth of the shining was for our tribesman.
These are truths, as Kandinsky put this, there to be experienced as
"internal necessity,"" or, as I have put this elsewhere,45 as something
which seems to us to46 have been "inevitable," but does so only after we
have experienced it.

According to Kandinsky, the internal truths within paintings are there
as a result of dynamic forces not capable of being captured by conceptual
thought. Too mysterious for you? It is the same with music. The
essence of music is its dynamic forces, forces that we perceive as real
and yet are not there in any material way-the force of the single tone,
the force of melody, the force of rhythm, the force of the return to the
tonic, the force of dissonance always heard against an imagined
consonance, the force of melodies wanting to go on, and so on, none of
which are there, either subjectively or objectively, and yet they are
there.47 In fact, what Kandinsky wanted to do with his paintings was

question of how we are to experience the podium, and asks about that experience before
considering other things about it. This is what makes the inquiry phenomenological.).
In other words, there is always more to human experience than the sheer presence
of things in the world; there is also the experience of the world as such, of the
open region within which things find their place. There is the experience of the
horizon or the limit from which all things become present and come to life-a
horizon and a limit that is itself never present as such, at least not as a thing.
There is the experience, and not just the postulate, or the philosophical axiom-this
is the mystery and the paradox-of the transcendental x, or horizon, from which
the actual experience of inner worldly things-things of use, things that are merely
present, or other Dasein-takes place.
MIGUEL DE BEISTEGUI, AESTHETICS AFTER METAPHYSICS: FROM MIMESIS TO METAPHOR 6970 (2012).
44. KANDINSKY: COMPLETE WRITINGS ON ART, supra note 27, at 177 & n.*; see also
HENRY, supra note 27, at 25.
45. See Linda Berger & Jack Sammons, The Law's Mystery, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD.

1 (2013).
46.
This "inevitable" is not something predictable, but something that suddenly and
often surprisingly appears as that which must be, although you did not know this
before its appearance. Inevitability then, in art and in opinions, appears only in
the performance and can be known in no other way. I don't want to make this
seem strange and unusual. It is a very ordinary and common perception. There
are moments when you are listening to a popular song, for example, when a turn
of a phrase, musical or lyrical; or a shift of keys; or an interesting riff or unlikely
arrangement is sensed as if it were always supposed to be as it is even though you
could not have known this prior to hearing it.
Id. at 8.
47. See generally Jack L. Sammons, The Law's Melody, 55 VILL. L. REv. 1143 (2010).
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to turn them into music, the "most non-material of the arts s he said,
so that their dynamic forces could be felt and their internal, necessary
truths uncovered through the interplay of these forces.49 In this, he
wanted (as did Sch6nberg)5 ° to show us what art is in a way that would
change our understanding of what it means for anything to be-think the
horses seen anew after an initial experience of the Chauvet Cave in our
heuristic.
But, if this is true for painting and for music, Kandinsky says, it must
also be true for all the arts: for sculpture, for architecture, for poetry, for
prose, for dance, and so on, and, yes, for you, true for law.5 1 Each of
the arts, he says, while each is unique in its own way, while each offers
its own truth, is the same in this connection to an internal truth.5 2 As
a summary of all he had written about this, we can now say with him:
All art is abstract art; all art makes the invisible visible.5" It was this
understanding and this experience of art that Kandinsky was seeking to
recover for his time and for ours.
All art is abstract? All art seeks to make the invisible visible? If law
is to be thought of as art in our time in any but the most superficial
ways, Kandinsky is telling us, it must be the art we understood through

48. KANDINSKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART, supra note 27, at 19.
49. See, e.g., id. at xix. Kandinsky is perhaps the most famous synesthete, i.e.,
someone for whom an experience in one of his or her senses, especially vision and color, but
also touch, smell, and taste, would produce a sensation in another sense, especially hearing
and sound. So he "heard" the color blue, for example, and "saw" the note C sharp. This
is true, but it does not make him so odd that we can dismiss what he says about the
relationships of colors to sounds or sounds to colors, for surely this is a matter of degree
and this was how he presented it, i.e., as something available to everyone in some degree.
There is evidence that he had this right. Kandinsky seems to have understood subjectivity
as the place at which all our senses come together-a more physical, fuller, and more
original place than the way we usually think of it.
50. Kandinsky frequently references Schonberg in his writings. E.g., KANDINSKY,
CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART, supra note 27, at 16-17. There is an excellent
anthology of articles about the relationship between these two artists: SCHONEERG AND
KANDINSKY: AN HISTORIC ENCOUNTER (Konrad Boehmer ed., 1997). Their correspondence
is collected in ARNOLD SCHONBERG-WASSILY KANDINSKY, LETTERS, PICTURES, AND
DOCUMENTS (Jelena Hahl-Koch ed., John C. Crawford trans., 1984). Most musicians, I
think, do not usually think of Schonberg this way, but he relied upon intuition and the
muse as much as Kandinsky. Regarding the artist, he says, "He has no say in the matter,
Expressive
it has nothing to do with what he wants; but since he must, he also can ....
content wishes to make itself understood; its upheaval produces form." SCHONBERG &
KANDINSKY: AN HISTORIC ENCOUNTER, supra at 183-84.
51. See HENRY, supra note 27, at 3. "And [for Kandinsky] this holds not only for
paintings but for every conceivable art form." Id.
52. See KANDINSKY: COMPLETE WRITINGS ON ART, supranote 27, at 257; HENRY, supra
note 27, at 102.
53. See HENRY, supra note 27, at ix, 12-21.
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its origin, and, as such, it must have its own connection to an internal
truth. This is clear. But for there to be law as art, we must become
capable through the experience of the interplay of law's dynamic forces
to experience the internal necessities of law and, with this, its internal
truths. To become capable of this, Kandinsky teaches us, requires
abstraction. It requires that law be removed from all of the ordinary
mannered functions that have been assigned to it so that we might
experience it anew in its own independent life.
Well then, but how can law be thought abstractly in this way? What
is left of "law" if it is separated from its ordinary social functions,
however mannered those functions may be, one could quite reasonably
ask? And what is the "invisible" that law as abstract art seeks to make
visible?
If we wanted to map Kandinsky's analysis upon law, we would say
that the "invisible" that law seeks to make visible is law itself in its
essence, "shining" we might say, in the way that paintings for Kandinsky sought to uncover art's essence, and we could add, that the "internal
truth" of law is justice experienced as the internal necessities of law (as
Kandinsky might describe beauty as an internal necessity of painting.)54 Such a form of justice would surely be authoritative for us, as
the experience of the Chauvet Cave was for our tribesman, because it
would offer to us our own emerging identity as a truthful, more
authentic way of life. In a very real sense then law and the justice it
seeks to uncover as its internal truth when mapped in Kandinsky's
terms could also be said to have come out of the experience of the
Chauvet Cave. Such a mapping, however, is not essential and could be
misleading, for all of Kandinsky's work is towards the recovery of the
experience of art; not towards a reconceptualization of it. For this to
happen to law for us, it is for us to recover this sense of law, as
Kandinsky was seeking to recover a sense of art, through the abstraction
he tells us is required. For, all art, he reminds us again, is abstract art.
**

*

Justice, even in the form of law's internal truth, is a cultural entity-as
are love, beauty, the person, religion, morals, and so forth-but no less
real for being cultural, no less "objective" (ifwe are to use that misleading word) for when the conditions of its required intentionality are met,
its "aboutness" as a phenomenologist would say, it appears for us owing
54. This then would be beauty as something uncovered and not a correspondence to
anything outside the painting itself, i.e., not matching some preconception of beauty as if
we already knew what beauty was.
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its appearance, owing its very existence in this sense, to the alterity that
art first offered to us. This is, however, to use language not available to
Kandinsky to address a central problem he faced. Before going further,
perhaps we should confront the problem the language Kandinsky does
use creates for us, now a hundred years after he was writing and
painting.
The central word in Kandinsky's lexicon is "internal" (which always
has a spiritual rather than a subjective connotation for him), and his
writings depend rather heavily upon metaphysical assumptions there in
the dichotomies of internal/external, subjective/objective, spiritual/material, soul/body, sensible/intelligible, and so forth. Yet his very
own account of painting struggles to resist these oppositional schemes.
Kandinsky, I think, fought against the language of his time, but also
struggled against himself, for his writings required him to try to say
what his paintings displayed, and this he could not do on his own terms.
Writing not just against painting as a representation of the "external,"
but also any subjective understanding of paintings as the expression of
an internal world of the artist, he sometimes seems trapped. It was very
important to him, for example, and as we will see in a moment, that the
dynamic force of color, and the internal truth of, say, yellow, not be a
matter of associations, not a matter of personal histories for either artist
or audience. But can these cultural "externalities," be avoided within his
written account of painting?
Perhaps rather than this metaphysics, what Kandinsky's paintings
and his writings move toward is the realization that the two worlds he
seems to describe-the internal and the external-are for him, and for us,
really but one, as they became for our young tribesman: one sensible
world with multiple, overlapping, modes of reality, the nature of which
is first revealed to us in art. So when Kandinsky says that he wants to
replace the "external" in determining what is to be painted with
"internal necessity," he does not mean something which arises from some
"internal" state of mind. "I have no desire to paint my own psychic
states,"5 he says, because for him there is no internal world there to
substitute for the external one in painting, and art is not to be a mimesis
or a representation of anything, including of that which is internal. "[Iun
reality," he says, "internal and external experiences cannot be so
brusquely separated."56
Instead of a brusque separation, and according to the phenomenologist
philosopher of art and an authority on Kandinsky, John Sallis,
Kandinsky's apparent subjectivity is not "as a self-enclosed interiority,

55.

KANDINSKY: COMPLETE WRITINGS ON ART, supra note 27, at 345.

56. Id. at 223.
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which could then be mirrored in its integrity by a sheerly external
artwork."5 7 Sallis goes on: "[He is not concerned with feeling, but with
a feeling about, i.e.,] reattaching feeling to works and things by way of
an intentional web." s He adds,
Through the education that, according to Kandinsky, painting can
produce in the soul, one could come even to attend to the inner life of
things as such, returning even to nature, outside painting, beginning,
in the end, to hearken to such proclamations as one finds occasionally
even in Kandinsky's otherwise sober, even reticent, texts, proclamations such as: "The world sounds. It is a cosmos of spiritually affective
beings. Thus, dead matter is a living spirit."59
Continuing with Sallis, "what is painted is [therefore] subjectivity as the
very scene of appearing and of reception [... 1, as the place where things
What is painted borders [thus] on another truth,
come to presence ....
presentationof this another truth. If indeed it remains presentation of
truth and not also its very opening.' °
This is difficult language, understandably so. What Kandinsky is
trying to do places him squarely against our ordinary ways of thinking.
Perhaps, to put this in other terms, what Sallis and Henry are suggesting is that the "internal necessities" of painting for Kandinsky, while of
course experienced by the artist, arise from the materials of the art
itself, and from no other source. (This is a way of describing painting
that places it close to absolute music, something Kandinsky would surely
have wanted.) These necessities we might then describe as "creative
discoveries" of art's truth, truths already existing there between the
subjective and the objective and awaiting the artist's uncovering. If
these truths are to be experienced by others, they must be approached
in the same way by the painting's audience of whom much is required.

But now we have a very serious problem. It is a problem for painting,
and it is a problem for our thinking law as art. It is here that perhaps
Kandinsky makes his most disturbing, but perhaps also his greatest
contribution. Kandinsky would not be content, (as I said Sallis was
perhaps suggesting), to say that the internal necessity of his paintings,
and therefore its content, arises from the materials of his art. He

57.

SALLIS, SHADES-OF PAINTING AT THE LIMIT, supra note 27,

58. Id.
59. Id. at 93.
60.

Id.

at

92.

20151

CAN LAW BE ART?

547

wanted to know why this happens, how this happens, and how its
happening could guide his painting and the painting of his students. He
wanted to attempt the apparently impossible task of an almost scientific
and analytical approach to that which produces "internal necessity," and,
in doing so, run the risk of making his analysis of painting the elements
of a technique to be copied by others. This would be a little like asking
William Carlos Williams, as he was working on perhaps his most famous
poem,6 why the chickens near the red wheelbarrow had to be white.
In fact, this is a very close analogy as you can see, and yet we can be
reasonably sure that Williams could not tell us. He could perhaps tell
us that this is an artist's intuition. Yes, and one arising from experience
as intuitions always do, but the most he could add to this convenient
description, I would imagine, is that the capacity to sense this internal
necessity requires careful attunement to the materials of one's art. So
yes, it is an artist's intuition, and yes it arises from experience, but it
does so from demanding experiences of a very particular kind.
This attuning is what interested Kandinsky. He wanted to find a way
to think this capacity without destroying it. He wanted to show
students the way toward the attunement to the materials of the art all
art requires. But, and here is the serious problem, if the content of a
painting is invisible-a dynamic force, an unseen, but yet an experienced
thing, an internal necessity becoming an internal truth-how can the
form of the painting-the paint, the colors, the lines, the shapes, the
textures, even the frame, or the wall upon which it is hung, and so forth,
all obviously visible, obviously external, how can these external things
Whatever the invisible ends of
nevertheless display the invisible?
painting may be-and these we may be willing to accept-do not the
means, keep it well within the world of the visible?. 2 Do not these keep
it tied, that is, to its ordinary functions? "All of Kandinsky's theoretical
and practical work will seek to undo this apparent fact." 3 And it is
this fact-our inability to separate law from its ordinary functions
because the means of law are so functional whatever we may think of its
ends-that we must address with him if we are to think of law as art.
Can law's forms, forms which seem so purposeful, so practical, so
pedestrian, so purely aesthetic-there primarily to please or to appease

61.

See WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, SPRING AND ALL (1923).

62. See HENRY, supra note 27, at 9. "If... painting were to assign itself the task of
painting the invisible, a unique problem would be presented to it then: how can it
represent in a visible way, though a painting which ... [is] 'external' to every regard,
this interior and invisible reality that is now [its'] theme." Id.
63. HENRY, supra note 27, at 23.
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in the exercise of power-can these forms be thought at all without their
ordinary functions?
The crucial move that Kandinsky makes to address this problem of
forms is the hardest one for us to accept. Form, he says,-points, line,
shapes, planes, colors, and so forth-are also to be determined by an
inner necessity, and this means selected on the basis of their internal
content.64 It is hard for us to accept this. We are much more tempted
to think that there could be no internal content of form for what we
experience of form we seem to experience through those external cultural
associations-personal contingencies, personal histories, including those
of the artist-he was seeking to avoid. We are, therefore, always tempted
to dissect art in these terms and often encouraged to do so by its experts.
For Kandinsky, however, the externals of form hide its internals from us
for each form has an internal reality in addition to its external one; each
has an independent life of its own.65 It is only our experience of form
through abstraction (our essential analysis-in the phenomenological
sense that Husserl gives this term) that can lead us to the essence of the
form.
Take as an example, one Kandinsky uses,"6 the form of the letter "A."
If we remove this from its association with the alphabet, with words,
with language, with conceptual thought, with its meaning within
language, and look only at its form, we experience something different,
something faint but something there, as if we were seeing this letter for
the first time. And, if we attend to this carefully, it provokes a
particular impression. Thus,
[tihe link between the affective, invisible, abstract content and the form
reduced to its pure appearance as a form deprived of all -linguistic or
conceptual meaning is not an arbitrary or variable link that would be
drawn from an external association and would thus be contingent. It
is an inner, necessary, and permanent link that is independent from
the subjectivity of the individual who experiences it. Naturally, this is
not a total independence. The one who contemplates a pure form feels
the linked tonality more or less strongly, depending on whether or not
one has the habit of paying attention to the world of forms and
depending on whether one is a painter, a connoisseur, or a novice. Yet,
the link does exist in each one of these cases. When the perception of
this link is deepened, for example, through education, the experienced
64.

65.

See KANDINSKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART, supra note 27, at 27-45.
Compare this with the following description of cave art: "It's as though [the color

red was] taking possession of the cave .... In these cases, red ocher is no long a simple
medium or a partner in the art, it is an entity on its own. As though the color itself has
power." DESDEMAINES-HUGON, supra note 2, at 186.

66. See HENRY, supra note 27, at 34.
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tonality will be a tonality of a specific type: 'happy,' 'sad,'"languishing,'
or 'proud' ....
Because this particular, specific tonality constitutes the
ontological reality of a colour or form and because there is only one
single reality showing itself to us in its two aspects-this tonality one the
one side and this color or design on the other-tonality is not joined to
colour or visible graphics as a result of an association of ideas that
would vary with individuals or depend on their individual histories.'1
Let me give you one more example of Kandinsky's method of teachings
this understanding of form. This time the example is the "point."
Hidden in [the incorporeal zero of the geometric point], are various
attributes which are "human" in nature. We think of this zero.., in
relation to the greatest possible brevity, i.e., to the highest degree of
restraint which, nevertheless, speaks. Thus, we look upon the
geometric point as the ultimate and most singular union of silence and
speech. The geometric point has, therefore, been given its material
form, in the first instance, in writing. It belongs to language and
signifies silence.. . .'
As we gradually tear the point out of its
restricted sphere of customary influence, its inner attributes-which
were silent until now-make themselves heard more and more. One
after the other, these qualities-inner tensions-come out of the depths
of its being and radiate their energy. Their effects and influence upon
human beings overcome ever more easily the resistances they set up.
In short, the dead point becomes a living thing.
To demonstrate this, he gives a beginning case of the point being
moved out of its ordinary functional use, into an impractical, that is, an
illogical position as follows:
-Today I am going to the movies.
Today I am going. To the movies
Today I. Am going to the movies""
He explains:
In the third sentence the illogical, in pure form, is at work. This may
be explained as a typographical error-the inner value of the point
flashes forth for a moment and is immediately extinguished. Let the
point be moved so far out of its practical-useful situation that it loses
its connection with the flow of the sentence.

67. Id. at 35.
68. KANDINSKY, POINT AND LINE TO PLANE, supra note 27, at 25, 26-27.
69. Id. at 27.
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Today I am going to the movies
In this case, the point must have considerable open space around it, in
order that its sound may have resonance. In spite of this, its sound
remains delicate-overpowered by the sound of the print surrounding
it. [By expanding] the surrounding space and [increasing] the size of
the point70 ... the sound of the point becomes clearer and more
powerful.

Now, he says, "[the point] begins its life as an independent being and its
subordination transforms itself into an inner-purposeful one. This is the
world of painting."7 1 And, he adds, the point, in its internal and
external sense, is the "proto-element" of all painting.7 2
Sensing this, this tension within the one point, is no small matter for
Kandinsky:
[I]t divides into two opposing groups not only the present day artists,
but the present day men [and women] altogether, depending on their
acceptance or rejection of it:
1) those persons who recognize not only materials things but also the
existence of the immaterial or spiritual, and 2) those who chose to
accept nothing beyond material evidence.
For the second category, art cannot exist ....
Although Kandinsky's metaphysics here are no longer a radical
thought-the acceptance of it being paved for us by Husserl, Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer among others-it remains radical in the
sense of contradicting the materialism of our time as it did the
materialism of his. It is this materialistic understanding of our world,
Kandinsky says, that art must always struggle against, and it is this

70. Id.
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id. at 32. Notice with me that the display of the point at the end of his lesson
about it was the first time that the relationship of foreground to background became
obvious to us. In bringing out the "sound" of "point," he also brings out the world of sound
as background required for us to hear this at all. So suddenly the space around the sound
of the point takes on a sound of its own, and he has opened for us the world of the point
as an uncovered truth.
73. Id. at 33. Notice, however, that there is in a sense nothing "immaterial" in any of
this, if one means by that beyond the sensible. Thus, the invisible he wishes to render
visible is the invisible of the visible. Michel Henry stated, "Tihese two tonalities have
appeared now where there was only one, two modalities of invisible life within us when
there was one single objective form in the world and there still only is one point before us."
HENRY, supra note 27, at 48.
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that abstraction addresses. As it does so, the inner life of form can
"deepen and 0]become more precise in its own way."
So for Kandinsky, all forms have their own independent lives, so that
the internal necessity which determines the content of the painting also
determines its form. Each color, to take the most important example of
form for him, has its own dynamic force and is to be selected for use in
a painting only on the basis of its internal necessity. (Thus, sometimes
horses must be blue.) In fact, it is this insight that is most central to his
art. What there was to teach, therefore, was not a technique, but a way
of being with the materials of the art, a certain form of receptiveness to
their own separate existence, their own independent lives as he would
often say, and this was something that could be taught without it
collapsing into technique. It is a way of thinking art without destroying
it.

Looking into the heart of human life, looking into meaning in this way
through art, is an ethical matter; it is the ethical matter, there at the
center of all other ethical thinking in its shaping of the perceptions upon
which such thinking always depends. What then would law be for us if
we were to think of it as art beginning in this form of truth? How
should we approach an understanding of this now with Kandinsky's
guidance?
This is a difficult task as I am sure you will agree. Perhaps we can
get a small start on it by taking on what is most difficult, law's forms,
to see if these can be understood as art in the way Kandinsky understood the forms of painting as art, that is, as having their own independent life, their own dynamic forces, their own internal necessities, and
their own connections to an internal truth. The two primary forms law
takes in our culture are as persuasive arguments and judicial judgments.
What if we, following his guidance, tried to think persuasion and
judgment in the way Kandinsky tried to think points, lines, shapes,
colors, and so forth? What if we removed these from their ordinary
functioning within the framework of the legal conversation to see them
anew, to see if these can be art, to see, that is, if they too make the
invisible visible? 75 Because persuasion is the more difficult case, and

74. HENRY, supra note 27, at 38.
75. The text that follows is based in part on two papers I have previously presented at
the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities: The Missing Poetry ofLegal
Rhetoric:A PhenomenologicalInquiry, (2014), and The Origin of the Judicial Opinion as
a Work of Art, (2013). I have yet to circulate these for publication, and much work is
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judgment has been discussed in these terms by me76 and by others
elsewhere," and because space here is short, let me just offer persuasion as our one example.
When we examine persuasion in this odd way, we experience
something also quite odd. Persuasion, true persuasion occurring within
a conversation (and not as the mere assent to something previous
decided external to it) is not something we do to others. It is instead a
surprising uncovering of that which persuades. In other words, there is
something within the situational context to be experienced by others as
a form of truth about that context. One cannot force the arrival of this
surprising moment of intuition through attempted control of the
conceptual thoughts of another-a representational matching of what is
somehow required-for it seems not to be a moment of calculation or of
conceptual thought at all. Put bluntly, it is not something purely under
conscious control, nor is it something grounded in our subjectivity, but
rather something which emerges. There is, in other words, something
invisible within situational contexts which persuasion seeks to make
visible, but cannot in our ordinary ways of thinking. Those can only
provide the openings out of which it emerges from its social context.
What is required, it seems, is an art of persuasion: a poetry of thought
with dynamic forces as the emergent properties of good arguments, but
not reducible to any of them. It is these dynamic forces upon which all
arguments are ultimately dependent, and from which they are all
ultimately derived. This then is an internal truth of persuasion and it
should determine our attempts to persuade. What we do when we
persuade is to try to display for others an internal necessity, an
inevitability, in particular situational contexts, as the truth of those
contexts, as Kandinsky was trying to do in Deluge.

Through art's mode of reality, each of the forms in which law is most
commonly displayed, when abstracted to independent lives of their own
as Kandinsky would have us do, offers dynamic forces-forces there, but
not there, as in music or painting- through which internal, necessary,

needed before I do so, but, for anyone who might be interested, I have made them available
in rough draft form, without most of the non-attributive footnotes, as works-in-progress on
my page on my SSRN Author Page: http:J/ssrm.com/author=-54430.

76. See, e.g., Berger & Sammons, The Law's Mystery, supra note 45; Sammons, The
Origin of the Judicial Opinion as a Work of Art, supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., CHARLES BAMBACH, THINKING THE POETIC MEASURE OF JUSTICE: HOLDERLIN-HEIDEGGER-CELAN (2013).
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truths can be sensed and justice uncovered from within the social
materials of our art and by which our art is framed. These dynamic
forces are the forces of a poetic thinking gone missing from our usual
thinking of law, as the dynamic forces of color, of lines, of shapes, and
so forth, had gone missing from painting according to Kandinsky.
Once again, this is no small matter, for there is a mode of reality of
what we call law, an alterity revealed to us through art, that we neglect
at the price of our own identity as humans. Said differently, law as art
offers to uncover a truth about our social world that we would otherwise
struggle to experience as real. It is in law as art that there can be a
"shining" of our lives together, our social lives that are always more than
they appear to be, or rather that what they appear to be is always more
than we can express. It is such a "shining," for example, that makes it
possible for something like "all men are created equal and they are
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights" to be understood at all.
The central requirement for this, perhaps the central requirement of
all art, is that we come to trust that which we experience in art, come
to trust that which we experience in the painting of Kandinsky or the
horses of the Chauvet Cave. Trusting in this way, however, is to accept
the humility of knowing that we are not really in control of the world
into which we have been thrown, a world never fully of our own making.
In this, in this simple humility, there is the potential of a close kinship
between an art central to who we are and an ethical sensibility to each
other expressed in law. It is true for us, as Heidegger said near the end
of his life, that "only a god can save us."78 It is also true, however, that
the gods are everywhere.

I don't want to minimize the difficulties involved in thinking of law as
art in the way I have described it here and my one example of persuasion is at most just a hint of what we could perhaps learn through
abstraction. It is not that this way of thinking law is too impractical or
too theoretical or too mysterious, for it is none of these things, and, in
truth, quite their opposite. It is that seeing that this is true, seeing that
it is practical, is extremely hard for us. It is, however, this very
difficulty all of you address in your own teaching, your own writing, and
in your own lives really. This way of understanding your own work is
what I have been trying to display for you here through the Cave and

78.

HEIDEGGER: THE MAN AND THE THINKER

57 (Thomas Sheehan ed., 1981).
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through Kandinsky. What does art have to do with judicial opinions or
with reading the law? Ask Jim White or Linda Berger. What do rules
have to do with art and what do we mean by "law?" Ask Joe Vining.
How can rhetoric and persuasion be an art and not manipulation? Ask
Gene Garver or Linda Edwards. How can the words we use have
internal necessary truth as do the brush strokes of Kandinsky? Ask
Richard Dawson. How can lawyers become artists in advising clients,
conducting trials, and constructing worlds, and what would this mean
for our practice and for the education it requires? Ask Daisy Floyd or
Pat Longan. Is there a unique form of practical wisdom for lawyers and
is it a performance art? Ask Mark Jones. What are we to make of our
comportment to cultural entities or our reliance upon intuition? Ask
Robert Audi. What does film-art as close to Wagner's "monumental art"
as art can be for us-have to teach us as legal artists? Was Hegel right
about art's highest form passing from us or is Kandinsky, Klee, or
Cezanne an adequate response to him? Ask David Ritchie. What does
music have to do with criminal appeals? What are we to make of our
relationship with clients if law is art? Ask Sarah Gerwig (who lives her
life as a clinical professor musically and teaches her students to do the
same). What do the aesthetics of law offer to the aesthetics of theology?
How does law as art consider death? Ask Tim Floyd. What is the art
of legal analysis, of precedence, or of the slow development over time of
new meanings for particular words? Ask Gary Simson. What is the art
of professing the law if law is art, and how are we to teach the personal
art of living well within the law? Ask Hal Lewis.
Deluge, as with all true art, is part of life's continued expression of
itself, Kandinsky says. It is "invisible life's ceaseless arrival into itself,"
or for Heidegger it is "Being's consciousness" of itself through Dasein.
In this, all life is then situated in a process of becoming. Art, Kandinsky
tells us -perhapsall good artists tell us-is the becoming of life. But then
so is your work with the art of law. It is because law is an art that it
can break free of its own bounds to point beyond and behind itself: freed
from the limits of calculation, of materialism, of fear, of the banalities of
conventions, and freed from the ordinary mannered functions that we
seek to impose upon it. It is because law is art that it can at times offer
brief peeks into frightening infinities of meaning offered to our
imaginations, and, through these, the potential for the sort of reconstruction of our lives together that Jim White and Richard Dawson describe
so well, but all of you seek I think. In law's art, law attempts a
continuous uncovering for us of that which is most human. And,
ironically perhaps, it is in this art, this most social of all the arts, that
art has the greatest opportunity of once again becoming central to our
lives and our lives together. So of course the word "art" is justificatory
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for you! It offers the justification of our own identity, the authoritativeness of who we are rather than the authoritarianism of the "empire of
force." 9 There is, I think, nothing more needed in our times, and there
is almost nothing more difficult to do. I deeply admire each of you for
taking on this daunting challenge.
Finally, my heartfelt thanks to each you for the great honor you have
so graciously and generously bestowed on me by being a part of this
Symposium. What you have done for me is not, however, something I
will look back on-not something, in the words of my favorite poet, that
will become a "quickly disappearing photograph [iun my more slowly
disappearing hand"S-because it will always be with me. Your gift to
me is a gift of sustenance, a gift of identity, a gift meaning really, for the
days to come.

79.

See generally LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE Op FORCE (H. Jefferson Powell

& James Boyd White eds., 2009). The expression, "empire of force," comes from Simone
Weil.
80. Rainer Maria Rilke, Portraitof My Fatheras a Young Man, in THE SELECTED
POETRY OP RANER MARIA RILKE (Stephen Mitchell trans. 1989).

